The five-point gap
Every so often someone notices that the team that wins the opening tip tends to win the game, and asks whether the tip matters. It's a fair question. Across 29 seasons of possession-by-possession data, 1997-98 through 2025-26, the team that wins the opening tip goes on to win 52.8% of its games. Put it in terms of the home team, and the gap looks even bigger: when the home team wins the tip it wins 61.4% of its games, and when it loses the tip that falls to 56.3%. That's a five-point swing on a two-second toss between two centers.
If the tip really caused that, it would be a big deal. I don't think it does. The short answer is that the possession you win is given right back by the rules, and the 52.8% is mostly about who is playing. Good teams tend to have good centers, and good centers tend to win tips. Once you account for the closing point spread, about half a point is left, which is too small to tell apart from zero. The one jump ball that does seem to matter is the one at the start of overtime.
The edge also isn't the same every year, which is the first hint that it isn't a fixed prize for winning the tip.
Tip winners’ win rate by season
Share of games won by the opening-tip winner, by season
See the data
| Season | Games | Tip winner win rate | Outside the chance band |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1997-98 | 1,260 | 55.2% | |
| 1998-99 | 791 | 56.3% | |
| 1999-00 | 1,264 | 56.6% | yes |
| 2000-01 | 1,260 | 52.1% | |
| 2001-02 | 1,260 | 50.6% | |
| 2002-03 | 1,277 | 51.7% | |
| 2003-04 | 1,271 | 50.9% | |
| 2004-05 | 1,314 | 52.4% | |
| 2005-06 | 1,319 | 52.0% | |
| 2006-07 | 1,309 | 51.6% | |
| 2007-08 | 1,316 | 51.8% | |
| 2008-09 | 1,315 | 53.2% | |
| 2009-10 | 1,312 | 52.2% | |
| 2010-11 | 1,311 | 53.3% | |
| 2011-12 | 1,074 | 52.7% | |
| 2012-13 | 1,314 | 55.6% | yes |
| 2013-14 | 1,319 | 55.3% | |
| 2014-15 | 1,311 | 54.4% | |
| 2015-16 | 1,316 | 54.1% | |
| 2016-17 | 1,309 | 49.3% | yes |
| 2017-18 | 1,312 | 51.8% | |
| 2018-19 | 1,312 | 53.3% | |
| 2019-20 | 1,143 | 54.3% | |
| 2020-21 | 1,171 | 51.7% | |
| 2021-22 | 1,323 | 51.7% | |
| 2022-23 | 1,320 | 50.7% | |
| 2023-24 | 1,319 | 52.8% | |
| 2024-25 | 1,321 | 49.5% | yes |
| 2025-26 | 1,322 | 55.8% | yes |
What the tip actually wins
Start with what the tip buys you, because the answer is almost nothing.
The NBA's rules even out the jump ball. The team that loses the tip gets the first possession of the second and third quarters, and the tip winner opens the first and fourth. (In these 36,765 games that alternation held 99.9% of the time.) Add it up, and on average the tip winner finishes a game with no extra possessions: the gap is under one hundredth of a possession, smaller than the noise. In 37% of games the counts come out exactly even, and in virtually every game they are within two.
You can see that accounting quarter by quarter. The tip winner gets about half an extra possession in the first quarter and half an extra in the fourth, and gives back half in each of the second and third. The scoreboard follows: tip winners outscore their opponents in the first and fourth quarters and get outscored in the second and third. That's just the rulebook, not momentum or effort.
What the tip winner gains, quarter by quarter
Tip winner's average edge over the tip loser, by quarter
See the data
| Quarter | Extra possessions | Scoring margin (points) |
|---|---|---|
| Q1 | +0.50 | +0.73 |
| Q2 | −0.50 | −0.29 |
| Q3 | −0.49 | −0.20 |
| Q4 | +0.49 | +0.60 |
The possession itself isn't much of a prize either. The opening possession of the game scores 0.97 points on average, against 1.08 for all possessions. Every quarter-opening possession is below average (about 0.99), probably because the defense is set and there's no transition to run, and the game's first possession is the weakest of the four. So the tip winner gets a below-average possession, and has to give one back by halftime.
So the tip itself is worth roughly nothing. Then why do tip winners win 52.8% of the time?
Winning tips is a skill
The first clue is that winning tips isn't a coin flip.
If jump balls were pure luck, almost every team's season-long tip rate would land between 39% and 61%. The actual range runs from 17% to 84%. The 2002-03 and 2003-04 Cavaliers, jumping 7'3" Žydrūnas Ilgauskas, won 84% of their tips two years running. The 2009-10 and 2010-11 Rockets, with Yao Ming hurt, mostly sent 6'9" power forward Luis Scola out to jump and won 17% two years running. Split any season into alternating games and the two halves' tip rates track each other (a correlation of 0.64, against 0.80 for win rates). The 2001-02 Heat, with Alonzo Mourning jumping nearly every night, once won 26 tips in a row, and Shaq's 2000-01 Lakers ran off 23 straight.
The skill belongs to one player, not the roster. About seven in eight opening jumps are taken by a center or a center/forward, and the average jumper stands a shade over 6'11". Unsurprisingly, height helps.
Height and winning the tip
How often a jumper wins the tip, by how many inches taller he is than the other jumper
See the data
| Jumper vs the other jumper | Wins the tip |
|---|---|
| −4″ or more | 36.8% |
| −3″ | 42.0% |
| −2″ | 44.0% |
| −1″ | 48.4% |
| even | 50.0% |
| +1″ | 51.6% |
| +2″ | 56.0% |
| +3″ | 58.0% |
| +4″ or more | 63.2% |
But height is only part of it. Timing and leaping matter too, and individual jumpers are consistent from year to year (a correlation of 0.74 between one season and the next). Shawn Bradley and Yao Ming both stood 7'6", but Bradley won nearly two-thirds of his jumps and Yao won 41%. Ben Wallace, at 6'9", won 61%. Nikola Jokić, maybe the best center of his generation, is a coin flip at 51.5%.
Tip rate and height for every regular jumper
Opening-tip win rate against height, players with 150 or more career opening jumps
See the data
| Player | Height | Opening jumps | Won | Seasons |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Victor Wembanyama | 7'4" | 192 | 76.6% | 2023-24 to 2025-26 |
| Andre Drummond | 6'11" | 702 | 73.1% | 2012-13 to 2025-26 |
| Arvydas Sabonis | 7'3" | 260 | 73.1% | 1997-98 to 2000-01 |
| Shaquille O'Neal | 7'1" | 1,021 | 71.2% | 1997-98 to 2010-11 |
| Steven Adams | 7'0" | 679 | 70.5% | 2013-14 to 2025-26 |
| Žydrūnas Ilgauskas | 7'3" | 790 | 69.9% | 1997-98 to 2010-11 |
| Jarrett Allen | 6'11" | 604 | 69.5% | 2017-18 to 2025-26 |
| Jaren Jackson Jr. | 6'11" | 240 | 68.3% | 2018-19 to 2025-26 |
| Jerome James | 7'1" | 181 | 67.4% | 2001-02 to 2006-07 |
| Jusuf Nurkić | 7'0" | 538 | 66.7% | 2014-15 to 2025-26 |
| Samuel Dalembert | 6'11" | 716 | 66.3% | 2003-04 to 2014-15 |
| Kristaps Porziņģis | 7'3" | 421 | 66.3% | 2016-17 to 2025-26 |
| Marcus Camby | 6'11" | 765 | 66.1% | 1997-98 to 2011-12 |
| Alonzo Mourning | 6'10" | 357 | 65.5% | 1997-98 to 2006-07 |
| Shawn Bradley | 7'6" | 258 | 65.5% | 1997-98 to 2004-05 |
| JaVale McGee | 7'0" | 364 | 65.1% | 2008-09 to 2022-23 |
| DeAndre Jordan | 6'11" | 852 | 65.0% | 2008-09 to 2025-26 |
| Kosta Koufos | 7'0" | 228 | 64.9% | 2008-09 to 2018-19 |
| Dwight Howard | 6'11" | 1,122 | 63.9% | 2004-05 to 2021-22 |
| Andrew Bynum | 7'0" | 375 | 63.7% | 2006-07 to 2013-14 |
| Brook Lopez | 7'0" | 1,179 | 62.4% | 2008-09 to 2025-26 |
| Elden Campbell | 6'11" | 308 | 62.3% | 1997-98 to 2003-04 |
| David Robinson | 7'1" | 492 | 62.0% | 1997-98 to 2002-03 |
| Joakim Noah | 6'11" | 481 | 61.5% | 2007-08 to 2016-17 |
| Ben Wallace | 6'9" | 946 | 60.6% | 1997-98 to 2011-12 |
| P.J. Brown | 6'11" | 165 | 60.0% | 1997-98 to 2006-07 |
| Marcin Gortat | 6'11" | 621 | 59.7% | 2008-09 to 2018-19 |
| Bam Adebayo | 6'9" | 544 | 59.7% | 2017-18 to 2025-26 |
| Deandre Ayton | 6'11" | 516 | 59.7% | 2018-19 to 2025-26 |
| Dikembe Mutombo | 7'2" | 572 | 59.4% | 1997-98 to 2008-09 |
| Mitchell Robinson | 7'1" | 229 | 59.4% | 2018-19 to 2025-26 |
| Tim Duncan | 6'11" | 945 | 59.3% | 1999-00 to 2015-16 |
| Marc Gasol | 7'1" | 921 | 59.2% | 2008-09 to 2020-21 |
| Erick Dampier | 6'11" | 779 | 59.2% | 1997-98 to 2010-11 |
| Joel Embiid | 7'0" | 539 | 59.0% | 2016-17 to 2025-26 |
| Jermaine O'Neal | 6'11" | 701 | 58.8% | 1999-00 to 2013-14 |
| John Henson | 6'11" | 155 | 58.7% | 2012-13 to 2019-20 |
| Vin Baker | 6'11" | 187 | 58.3% | 1997-98 to 2002-03 |
| Chris Bosh | 6'11" | 742 | 58.0% | 2003-04 to 2015-16 |
| Dan Gadzuric | 6'11" | 162 | 58.0% | 2002-03 to 2010-11 |
| Antonio McDyess | 6'9" | 280 | 57.5% | 1997-98 to 2007-08 |
| Patrick Ewing | 7'0" | 226 | 57.5% | 1997-98 to 2001-02 |
| Wendell Carter Jr. | 6'9" | 363 | 57.0% | 2018-19 to 2025-26 |
| Rudy Gobert | 7'1" | 903 | 56.4% | 2014-15 to 2025-26 |
| Nicolas Claxton | 6'11" | 296 | 56.4% | 2020-21 to 2025-26 |
| Pau Gasol | 7'0" | 928 | 56.2% | 2001-02 to 2018-19 |
| Tyson Chandler | 7'1" | 944 | 56.0% | 2001-02 to 2019-20 |
| Anthony Davis | 6'10" | 673 | 55.7% | 2012-13 to 2025-26 |
| Hassan Whiteside | 7'0" | 349 | 55.3% | 2014-15 to 2021-22 |
| Amar'e Stoudemire | 6'11" | 435 | 55.2% | 2002-03 to 2015-16 |
| Bismack Biyombo | 6'9" | 353 | 55.0% | 2011-12 to 2025-26 |
| Chet Holmgren | 7'0" | 228 | 54.4% | 2023-24 to 2025-26 |
| Ervin Johnson | 6'11" | 228 | 53.9% | 1997-98 to 2004-05 |
| Raef LaFrentz | 6'11" | 197 | 53.8% | 1998-99 to 2005-06 |
| Greg Ostertag | 7'2" | 257 | 53.7% | 1997-98 to 2005-06 |
| Dewayne Dedmon | 7'0" | 207 | 53.6% | 2013-14 to 2022-23 |
| Josh Smith | 6'9" | 668 | 53.3% | 2004-05 to 2015-16 |
| Darko Milicic | 7'0" | 160 | 53.1% | 2005-06 to 2011-12 |
| Jakob Poeltl | 7'1" | 399 | 52.9% | 2016-17 to 2025-26 |
| Olden Polynice | 6'11" | 242 | 52.9% | 1997-98 to 2000-01 |
| Richaun Holmes | 6'10" | 161 | 52.8% | 2015-16 to 2024-25 |
| Tony Battie | 6'11" | 273 | 52.4% | 1997-98 to 2011-12 |
| Kevin Garnett | 6'11" | 919 | 52.2% | 1997-98 to 2014-15 |
| Andrew Bogut | 7'0" | 649 | 52.2% | 2005-06 to 2018-19 |
| Luc Longley | 7'2" | 194 | 52.1% | 1997-98 to 2000-01 |
| Nikola Jokić | 6'10" | 765 | 51.5% | 2015-16 to 2025-26 |
| Dale Davis | 6'11" | 315 | 51.4% | 1997-98 to 2006-07 |
| Joel Przybilla | 7'1" | 398 | 51.3% | 2000-01 to 2012-13 |
| Kelvin Cato | 6'11" | 246 | 51.2% | 1997-98 to 2004-05 |
| Eddy Curry | 7'0" | 333 | 51.1% | 2001-02 to 2011-12 |
| Nene | 6'11" | 333 | 50.5% | 2002-03 to 2018-19 |
| Karl-Anthony Towns | 7'0" | 670 | 50.0% | 2015-16 to 2025-26 |
| Derrick Favors | 6'10" | 237 | 49.8% | 2010-11 to 2021-22 |
| Rasho Nesterovic | 7'0" | 199 | 49.7% | 2000-01 to 2008-09 |
| Mark Blount | 7'0" | 272 | 49.6% | 2000-01 to 2007-08 |
| Adonal Foyle | 6'10" | 265 | 49.4% | 1999-00 to 2006-07 |
| Robin Lopez | 7'0" | 630 | 49.2% | 2008-09 to 2023-24 |
| Jonas Valanciunas | 7'0" | 837 | 49.1% | 2012-13 to 2025-26 |
| Kwame Brown | 6'11" | 194 | 48.5% | 2001-02 to 2012-13 |
| Al Horford | 6'10" | 559 | 48.3% | 2007-08 to 2025-26 |
| Jason Collins | 7'0" | 430 | 48.1% | 2001-02 to 2013-14 |
| Chris Mihm | 7'1" | 242 | 47.9% | 2000-01 to 2007-08 |
| Theo Ratliff | 6'10" | 484 | 47.7% | 1997-98 to 2009-10 |
| Nikola Pekovic | 6'11" | 177 | 47.5% | 2010-11 to 2014-15 |
| Vlade Divac | 7'1" | 479 | 47.4% | 1997-98 to 2003-04 |
| DeMarcus Cousins | 6'11" | 186 | 47.3% | 2010-11 to 2021-22 |
| Clint Capela | 6'10" | 631 | 46.8% | 2015-16 to 2025-26 |
| Serge Ibaka | 6'10" | 475 | 46.3% | 2010-11 to 2021-22 |
| Nerlens Noel | 6'11" | 225 | 45.8% | 2014-15 to 2022-23 |
| Amir Johnson | 6'9" | 288 | 45.5% | 2008-09 to 2018-19 |
| Emeka Okafor | 6'10" | 581 | 45.4% | 2004-05 to 2017-18 |
| Kevon Looney | 6'9" | 263 | 45.2% | 2016-17 to 2025-26 |
| Jalen Duren | 6'11" | 255 | 45.1% | 2022-23 to 2025-26 |
| Mehmet Okur | 6'11" | 376 | 44.7% | 2002-03 to 2011-12 |
| Miles Plumlee | 6'11" | 166 | 44.6% | 2013-14 to 2017-18 |
| Kurt Thomas | 6'9" | 275 | 44.0% | 2000-01 to 2010-11 |
| Timofey Mozgov | 7'1" | 296 | 43.9% | 2010-11 to 2017-18 |
| Brad Miller | 6'11" | 434 | 43.8% | 2000-01 to 2010-11 |
| Roy Hibbert | 7'2" | 590 | 43.7% | 2008-09 to 2016-17 |
| Michael Olowokandi | 7'0" | 306 | 43.5% | 1998-99 to 2003-04 |
| Mason Plumlee | 6'11" | 486 | 43.0% | 2013-14 to 2025-26 |
| Jamaal Magloire | 6'11" | 323 | 42.7% | 2001-02 to 2011-12 |
| Jeff Green | 6'9" | 179 | 42.5% | 2008-09 to 2024-25 |
| Al Jefferson | 6'10" | 484 | 42.4% | 2006-07 to 2017-18 |
| Keith Van Horn | 6'10" | 313 | 42.2% | 1997-98 to 2002-03 |
| Andris Biedrins | 6'11" | 276 | 41.7% | 2004-05 to 2012-13 |
| Kendrick Perkins | 6'10" | 399 | 41.6% | 2004-05 to 2013-14 |
| Alex Len | 7'1" | 219 | 41.6% | 2013-14 to 2024-25 |
| JJ Hickson | 6'9" | 190 | 41.6% | 2009-10 to 2015-16 |
| Jarron Collins | 6'11" | 179 | 41.3% | 2001-02 to 2009-10 |
| Yao Ming | 7'6" | 404 | 41.1% | 2002-03 to 2010-11 |
| Brian Grant | 6'9" | 247 | 40.9% | 2000-01 to 2005-06 |
| LaMarcus Aldridge | 6'11" | 277 | 40.8% | 2006-07 to 2021-22 |
| Ivica Zubac | 7'1" | 538 | 40.7% | 2016-17 to 2025-26 |
| Alperen Sengun | 6'10" | 258 | 39.9% | 2021-22 to 2025-26 |
| Spencer Hawes | 7'1" | 345 | 39.1% | 2008-09 to 2016-17 |
| Zaza Pachulia | 6'11" | 336 | 39.0% | 2003-04 to 2018-19 |
| Willie Cauley-Stein | 7'0" | 217 | 38.7% | 2015-16 to 2020-21 |
| Chris Kaman | 7'0" | 412 | 38.3% | 2003-04 to 2015-16 |
| Chris Wilcox | 6'10" | 173 | 38.2% | 2002-03 to 2012-13 |
| Nazr Mohammed | 6'10" | 342 | 36.8% | 1999-00 to 2013-14 |
| Jahidi White | 6'9" | 190 | 36.3% | 1999-00 to 2003-04 |
| Brendan Haywood | 7'0" | 476 | 35.7% | 2001-02 to 2012-13 |
| Rasheed Wallace | 6'11" | 433 | 35.6% | 1997-98 to 2009-10 |
| Daniel Gafford | 6'10" | 250 | 35.6% | 2019-20 to 2025-26 |
| Andrew DeClercq | 6'10" | 222 | 35.6% | 1997-98 to 2003-04 |
| Antonio Davis | 6'9" | 287 | 35.5% | 1997-98 to 2004-05 |
| Jason Thompson | 6'11" | 260 | 35.4% | 2008-09 to 2014-15 |
| Nikola Vučević | 7'0" | 953 | 35.3% | 2011-12 to 2025-26 |
| Jared Jeffries | 6'11" | 159 | 35.2% | 2005-06 to 2009-10 |
| Dirk Nowitzki | 7'0" | 202 | 35.1% | 1998-99 to 2016-17 |
| Myles Turner | 6'11" | 708 | 33.3% | 2015-16 to 2025-26 |
| Tristan Thompson | 6'9" | 362 | 31.8% | 2011-12 to 2021-22 |
| Greg Monroe | 6'11" | 210 | 30.0% | 2010-11 to 2018-19 |
| Dwight Powell | 6'11" | 229 | 29.7% | 2015-16 to 2025-26 |
| Domantas Sabonis | 6'11" | 327 | 29.4% | 2017-18 to 2025-26 |
| Cody Zeller | 7'0" | 252 | 29.4% | 2014-15 to 2022-23 |
| Best jumpers | Won | Worst jumpers | Won |
|---|---|---|---|
| Andre Drummond | 73.1% | Domantas Sabonis | 29.4% |
| Shaquille O'Neal | 71.2% | Tristan Thompson | 31.8% |
| Steven Adams | 70.5% | Myles Turner | 33.3% |
| Žydrūnas Ilgauskas | 69.9% | Nikola Vučević | 35.3% |
| Jarrett Allen | 69.5% | Rasheed Wallace | 35.6% |
Share of opening jump balls won, from the league's play-by-play record of who actually jumped. Minimum 300 career opening jumps (77 players qualify). Victor Wembanyama had 192 through 2025-26, too few for the list.
That's the key point for everything that follows: being good at tips and being good at basketball are different skills, but they tend to show up in the same kinds of players.
Good teams win more tips
Better teams do win more tips. Across 863 team-seasons the relationship between tip rate and win rate is clear but loose, because good teams tend to have good centers, and good centers tend to be big and athletic. An extra 10 points of tip rate goes with about 3 extra wins per 82 games. That's a correlation, not a cause, and the exceptions make that pretty obvious.
Tip rate and win rate by team-season
863 team-seasons: share of opening tips won against share of games won
See the data
| Team-season | Tips won | Games won |
|---|---|---|
| ATL 1997-98 | 68.3% | 61.0% |
| ATL 1998-99 | 62.0% | 62.0% |
| ATL 1999-00 | 61.0% | 34.1% |
| ATL 2000-01 | 52.4% | 30.5% |
| ATL 2001-02 | 31.7% | 40.2% |
| ATL 2002-03 | 52.4% | 42.7% |
| ATL 2003-04 | 36.6% | 34.1% |
| ATL 2004-05 | 40.2% | 15.9% |
| ATL 2005-06 | 50.0% | 31.7% |
| ATL 2006-07 | 54.9% | 36.6% |
| ATL 2007-08 | 59.8% | 45.1% |
| ATL 2008-09 | 58.5% | 57.3% |
| ATL 2009-10 | 54.9% | 64.6% |
| ATL 2010-11 | 46.3% | 53.7% |
| ATL 2011-12 | 56.1% | 60.6% |
| ATL 2012-13 | 52.4% | 53.7% |
| ATL 2013-14 | 35.4% | 46.3% |
| ATL 2014-15 | 47.6% | 73.2% |
| ATL 2015-16 | 56.1% | 58.5% |
| ATL 2016-17 | 63.4% | 52.4% |
| ATL 2017-18 | 56.1% | 29.3% |
| ATL 2018-19 | 42.7% | 35.4% |
| ATL 2019-20 | 40.3% | 29.9% |
| ATL 2020-21 | 50.0% | 56.9% |
| ATL 2021-22 | 39.3% | 53.6% |
| ATL 2022-23 | 43.4% | 50.6% |
| ATL 2023-24 | 47.0% | 43.4% |
| ATL 2024-25 | 51.2% | 47.6% |
| ATL 2025-26 | 50.0% | 56.1% |
| BOS 1997-98 | 46.3% | 43.9% |
| BOS 1998-99 | 52.0% | 38.0% |
| BOS 1999-00 | 50.0% | 42.7% |
| BOS 2000-01 | 59.8% | 43.9% |
| BOS 2001-02 | 52.4% | 59.8% |
| BOS 2002-03 | 62.2% | 53.7% |
| BOS 2003-04 | 48.8% | 43.9% |
| BOS 2004-05 | 57.3% | 54.9% |
| BOS 2005-06 | 46.3% | 40.2% |
| BOS 2006-07 | 39.0% | 29.3% |
| BOS 2007-08 | 36.6% | 80.5% |
| BOS 2008-09 | 42.7% | 75.6% |
| BOS 2009-10 | 57.3% | 61.0% |
| BOS 2010-11 | 59.8% | 68.3% |
| BOS 2011-12 | 54.5% | 59.1% |
| BOS 2012-13 | 54.3% | 50.6% |
| BOS 2013-14 | 42.7% | 30.5% |
| BOS 2014-15 | 39.0% | 48.8% |
| BOS 2015-16 | 41.5% | 58.5% |
| BOS 2016-17 | 36.6% | 64.6% |
| BOS 2017-18 | 42.7% | 67.1% |
| BOS 2018-19 | 50.0% | 59.8% |
| BOS 2019-20 | 36.1% | 66.7% |
| BOS 2020-21 | 45.2% | 50.7% |
| BOS 2021-22 | 61.0% | 62.2% |
| BOS 2022-23 | 51.2% | 69.5% |
| BOS 2023-24 | 73.2% | 78.0% |
| BOS 2024-25 | 54.9% | 74.4% |
| BOS 2025-26 | 42.7% | 68.3% |
| CLE 1997-98 | 68.3% | 57.3% |
| CLE 1998-99 | 36.0% | 44.0% |
| CLE 1999-00 | 42.7% | 39.0% |
| CLE 2000-01 | 58.5% | 36.6% |
| CLE 2001-02 | 56.1% | 35.4% |
| CLE 2002-03 | 84.1% | 20.7% |
| CLE 2003-04 | 84.1% | 42.7% |
| CLE 2004-05 | 70.7% | 51.2% |
| CLE 2005-06 | 61.0% | 61.0% |
| CLE 2006-07 | 61.0% | 61.0% |
| CLE 2007-08 | 56.1% | 54.9% |
| CLE 2008-09 | 69.5% | 80.5% |
| CLE 2009-10 | 64.6% | 74.4% |
| CLE 2010-11 | 51.2% | 23.2% |
| CLE 2011-12 | 33.3% | 31.8% |
| CLE 2012-13 | 36.6% | 29.3% |
| CLE 2013-14 | 46.3% | 40.2% |
| CLE 2014-15 | 40.2% | 64.6% |
| CLE 2015-16 | 42.7% | 69.5% |
| CLE 2016-17 | 31.7% | 62.2% |
| CLE 2017-18 | 20.7% | 61.0% |
| CLE 2018-19 | 31.7% | 23.2% |
| CLE 2019-20 | 36.9% | 29.2% |
| CLE 2020-21 | 76.4% | 30.6% |
| CLE 2021-22 | 63.1% | 52.4% |
| CLE 2022-23 | 62.2% | 62.2% |
| CLE 2023-24 | 74.4% | 58.5% |
| CLE 2024-25 | 76.8% | 78.0% |
| CLE 2025-26 | 64.6% | 63.4% |
| NOP 2002-03 | 46.3% | 57.3% |
| NOP 2003-04 | 37.8% | 50.0% |
| NOP 2004-05 | 57.3% | 22.0% |
| NOP 2005-06 | 58.5% | 46.3% |
| NOP 2006-07 | 51.2% | 47.6% |
| NOP 2007-08 | 53.7% | 68.3% |
| NOP 2008-09 | 45.1% | 59.8% |
| NOP 2009-10 | 54.9% | 45.1% |
| NOP 2010-11 | 39.0% | 56.1% |
| NOP 2011-12 | 28.8% | 31.8% |
| NOP 2012-13 | 32.9% | 32.9% |
| NOP 2013-14 | 41.5% | 41.5% |
| NOP 2014-15 | 41.5% | 54.9% |
| NOP 2015-16 | 52.4% | 36.6% |
| NOP 2016-17 | 65.9% | 41.5% |
| NOP 2017-18 | 57.3% | 58.5% |
| NOP 2018-19 | 54.9% | 40.2% |
| NOP 2019-20 | 44.4% | 41.7% |
| NOP 2020-21 | 68.1% | 43.1% |
| NOP 2021-22 | 51.2% | 45.2% |
| NOP 2022-23 | 54.2% | 50.6% |
| NOP 2023-24 | 48.8% | 59.5% |
| NOP 2024-25 | 26.8% | 25.6% |
| NOP 2025-26 | 24.4% | 31.7% |
| CHI 1997-98 | 48.8% | 75.6% |
| CHI 1998-99 | 22.0% | 26.0% |
| CHI 1999-00 | 23.2% | 20.7% |
| CHI 2000-01 | 26.8% | 18.3% |
| CHI 2001-02 | 39.0% | 25.6% |
| CHI 2002-03 | 57.3% | 36.6% |
| CHI 2003-04 | 47.6% | 28.0% |
| CHI 2004-05 | 48.8% | 57.3% |
| CHI 2005-06 | 46.3% | 50.0% |
| CHI 2006-07 | 50.0% | 59.8% |
| CHI 2007-08 | 58.5% | 40.2% |
| CHI 2008-09 | 52.4% | 50.0% |
| CHI 2009-10 | 59.8% | 50.0% |
| CHI 2010-11 | 53.7% | 75.6% |
| CHI 2011-12 | 53.0% | 75.8% |
| CHI 2012-13 | 61.0% | 54.9% |
| CHI 2013-14 | 63.4% | 58.5% |
| CHI 2014-15 | 52.4% | 61.0% |
| CHI 2015-16 | 57.3% | 51.2% |
| CHI 2016-17 | 59.8% | 50.0% |
| CHI 2017-18 | 48.8% | 32.9% |
| CHI 2018-19 | 54.9% | 26.8% |
| CHI 2019-20 | 50.8% | 33.8% |
| CHI 2020-21 | 31.9% | 43.1% |
| CHI 2021-22 | 45.1% | 56.1% |
| CHI 2022-23 | 35.7% | 48.8% |
| CHI 2023-24 | 38.1% | 47.6% |
| CHI 2024-25 | 19.3% | 47.0% |
| CHI 2025-26 | 37.8% | 37.8% |
| DAL 1997-98 | 50.0% | 24.4% |
| DAL 1998-99 | 54.0% | 38.0% |
| DAL 1999-00 | 61.0% | 48.8% |
| DAL 2000-01 | 50.0% | 64.6% |
| DAL 2001-02 | 42.7% | 69.5% |
| DAL 2002-03 | 64.6% | 73.2% |
| DAL 2003-04 | 40.2% | 63.4% |
| DAL 2004-05 | 56.1% | 70.7% |
| DAL 2005-06 | 54.9% | 73.2% |
| DAL 2006-07 | 59.8% | 81.7% |
| DAL 2007-08 | 54.9% | 62.2% |
| DAL 2008-09 | 53.7% | 61.0% |
| DAL 2009-10 | 54.9% | 67.1% |
| DAL 2010-11 | 54.9% | 69.5% |
| DAL 2011-12 | 22.7% | 54.5% |
| DAL 2012-13 | 51.2% | 50.0% |
| DAL 2013-14 | 65.9% | 59.8% |
| DAL 2014-15 | 48.8% | 61.0% |
| DAL 2015-16 | 29.3% | 51.2% |
| DAL 2016-17 | 31.7% | 40.2% |
| DAL 2017-18 | 22.0% | 29.3% |
| DAL 2018-19 | 47.6% | 40.2% |
| DAL 2019-20 | 60.0% | 57.3% |
| DAL 2020-21 | 44.4% | 58.3% |
| DAL 2021-22 | 40.2% | 63.4% |
| DAL 2022-23 | 36.6% | 46.3% |
| DAL 2023-24 | 45.1% | 61.0% |
| DAL 2024-25 | 50.0% | 47.6% |
| DAL 2025-26 | 37.8% | 31.7% |
| DEN 1997-98 | 30.5% | 13.4% |
| DEN 1998-99 | 56.0% | 28.0% |
| DEN 1999-00 | 54.9% | 42.7% |
| DEN 2000-01 | 53.7% | 48.8% |
| DEN 2001-02 | 52.4% | 32.9% |
| DEN 2002-03 | 45.1% | 20.7% |
| DEN 2003-04 | 72.0% | 52.4% |
| DEN 2004-05 | 64.6% | 59.8% |
| DEN 2005-06 | 70.7% | 53.7% |
| DEN 2006-07 | 64.6% | 54.9% |
| DEN 2007-08 | 59.8% | 61.0% |
| DEN 2008-09 | 51.2% | 65.9% |
| DEN 2009-10 | 51.2% | 64.6% |
| DEN 2010-11 | 48.8% | 61.0% |
| DEN 2011-12 | 51.5% | 57.6% |
| DEN 2012-13 | 65.9% | 69.5% |
| DEN 2013-14 | 46.3% | 43.9% |
| DEN 2014-15 | 47.6% | 36.6% |
| DEN 2015-16 | 42.7% | 40.2% |
| DEN 2016-17 | 40.2% | 48.8% |
| DEN 2017-18 | 37.8% | 56.1% |
| DEN 2018-19 | 46.3% | 65.9% |
| DEN 2019-20 | 52.1% | 63.0% |
| DEN 2020-21 | 55.6% | 65.3% |
| DEN 2021-22 | 58.5% | 58.5% |
| DEN 2022-23 | 47.6% | 64.6% |
| DEN 2023-24 | 58.5% | 69.5% |
| DEN 2024-25 | 47.6% | 61.0% |
| DEN 2025-26 | 57.3% | 65.9% |
| GSW 1997-98 | 30.5% | 23.2% |
| GSW 1998-99 | 58.0% | 42.0% |
| GSW 1999-00 | 41.5% | 23.2% |
| GSW 2000-01 | 50.0% | 20.7% |
| GSW 2001-02 | 72.0% | 25.6% |
| GSW 2002-03 | 68.3% | 46.3% |
| GSW 2003-04 | 62.2% | 45.1% |
| GSW 2004-05 | 41.5% | 41.5% |
| GSW 2005-06 | 32.9% | 41.5% |
| GSW 2006-07 | 41.5% | 51.2% |
| GSW 2007-08 | 34.1% | 58.5% |
| GSW 2008-09 | 45.1% | 35.4% |
| GSW 2009-10 | 32.9% | 31.7% |
| GSW 2010-11 | 31.7% | 43.9% |
| GSW 2011-12 | 31.8% | 34.8% |
| GSW 2012-13 | 59.8% | 57.3% |
| GSW 2013-14 | 52.4% | 62.2% |
| GSW 2014-15 | 51.2% | 81.7% |
| GSW 2015-16 | 54.9% | 89.0% |
| GSW 2016-17 | 46.3% | 81.7% |
| GSW 2017-18 | 39.0% | 70.7% |
| GSW 2018-19 | 46.3% | 69.5% |
| GSW 2019-20 | 33.8% | 23.1% |
| GSW 2020-21 | 51.4% | 52.7% |
| GSW 2021-22 | 32.9% | 64.6% |
| GSW 2022-23 | 50.0% | 53.7% |
| GSW 2023-24 | 41.0% | 55.4% |
| GSW 2024-25 | 42.2% | 59.0% |
| GSW 2025-26 | 45.2% | 45.2% |
| HOU 1997-98 | 58.5% | 50.0% |
| HOU 1998-99 | 56.0% | 62.0% |
| HOU 1999-00 | 43.9% | 41.5% |
| HOU 2000-01 | 48.8% | 54.9% |
| HOU 2001-02 | 50.0% | 34.1% |
| HOU 2002-03 | 39.0% | 52.4% |
| HOU 2003-04 | 50.0% | 54.9% |
| HOU 2004-05 | 37.8% | 62.2% |
| HOU 2005-06 | 52.4% | 41.5% |
| HOU 2006-07 | 42.7% | 63.4% |
| HOU 2007-08 | 51.2% | 67.1% |
| HOU 2008-09 | 36.6% | 64.6% |
| HOU 2009-10 | 17.1% | 51.2% |
| HOU 2010-11 | 17.1% | 52.4% |
| HOU 2011-12 | 71.2% | 51.5% |
| HOU 2012-13 | 36.6% | 54.9% |
| HOU 2013-14 | 62.2% | 65.9% |
| HOU 2014-15 | 48.8% | 68.3% |
| HOU 2015-16 | 64.6% | 50.0% |
| HOU 2016-17 | 40.2% | 67.1% |
| HOU 2017-18 | 41.5% | 79.3% |
| HOU 2018-19 | 50.0% | 64.6% |
| HOU 2019-20 | 40.3% | 61.1% |
| HOU 2020-21 | 48.6% | 23.6% |
| HOU 2021-22 | 59.8% | 24.4% |
| HOU 2022-23 | 34.1% | 26.8% |
| HOU 2023-24 | 43.9% | 50.0% |
| HOU 2024-25 | 41.5% | 63.4% |
| HOU 2025-26 | 37.8% | 63.4% |
| LAC 1997-98 | 41.5% | 20.7% |
| LAC 1998-99 | 40.0% | 18.0% |
| LAC 1999-00 | 41.5% | 18.3% |
| LAC 2000-01 | 34.1% | 37.8% |
| LAC 2001-02 | 46.3% | 47.6% |
| LAC 2002-03 | 46.3% | 32.9% |
| LAC 2003-04 | 25.6% | 34.1% |
| LAC 2004-05 | 39.0% | 45.1% |
| LAC 2005-06 | 43.9% | 57.3% |
| LAC 2006-07 | 32.9% | 48.8% |
| LAC 2007-08 | 46.3% | 28.0% |
| LAC 2008-09 | 53.7% | 23.2% |
| LAC 2009-10 | 52.4% | 35.4% |
| LAC 2010-11 | 64.6% | 39.0% |
| LAC 2011-12 | 71.2% | 60.6% |
| LAC 2012-13 | 78.0% | 68.3% |
| LAC 2013-14 | 69.5% | 69.5% |
| LAC 2014-15 | 64.6% | 68.3% |
| LAC 2015-16 | 70.7% | 64.6% |
| LAC 2016-17 | 65.9% | 62.2% |
| LAC 2017-18 | 62.2% | 51.2% |
| LAC 2018-19 | 59.8% | 58.5% |
| LAC 2019-20 | 44.4% | 68.1% |
| LAC 2020-21 | 44.4% | 65.3% |
| LAC 2021-22 | 34.5% | 50.0% |
| LAC 2022-23 | 50.0% | 53.7% |
| LAC 2023-24 | 28.0% | 62.2% |
| LAC 2024-25 | 46.3% | 61.0% |
| LAC 2025-26 | 47.0% | 50.6% |
| LAL 1997-98 | 64.6% | 74.4% |
| LAL 1998-99 | 72.0% | 62.0% |
| LAL 1999-00 | 73.2% | 81.7% |
| LAL 2000-01 | 82.9% | 68.3% |
| LAL 2001-02 | 63.4% | 70.7% |
| LAL 2002-03 | 67.1% | 61.0% |
| LAL 2003-04 | 62.2% | 68.3% |
| LAL 2004-05 | 52.4% | 41.5% |
| LAL 2005-06 | 40.2% | 54.9% |
| LAL 2006-07 | 51.2% | 51.2% |
| LAL 2007-08 | 50.0% | 69.5% |
| LAL 2008-09 | 61.0% | 79.3% |
| LAL 2009-10 | 73.2% | 69.5% |
| LAL 2010-11 | 58.5% | 69.5% |
| LAL 2011-12 | 62.1% | 62.1% |
| LAL 2012-13 | 67.1% | 54.9% |
| LAL 2013-14 | 53.7% | 32.9% |
| LAL 2014-15 | 39.0% | 25.6% |
| LAL 2015-16 | 34.1% | 20.7% |
| LAL 2016-17 | 34.1% | 31.7% |
| LAL 2017-18 | 58.5% | 42.7% |
| LAL 2018-19 | 62.2% | 45.1% |
| LAL 2019-20 | 67.6% | 73.2% |
| LAL 2020-21 | 58.9% | 58.9% |
| LAL 2021-22 | 61.0% | 40.2% |
| LAL 2022-23 | 62.7% | 53.0% |
| LAL 2023-24 | 56.0% | 58.3% |
| LAL 2024-25 | 62.2% | 61.0% |
| LAL 2025-26 | 65.9% | 64.6% |
| MIA 1997-98 | 53.7% | 67.1% |
| MIA 1998-99 | 68.0% | 66.0% |
| MIA 1999-00 | 62.2% | 63.4% |
| MIA 2000-01 | 29.3% | 61.0% |
| MIA 2001-02 | 79.3% | 43.9% |
| MIA 2002-03 | 36.6% | 30.5% |
| MIA 2003-04 | 47.6% | 51.2% |
| MIA 2004-05 | 62.2% | 72.0% |
| MIA 2005-06 | 67.1% | 63.4% |
| MIA 2006-07 | 63.4% | 53.7% |
| MIA 2007-08 | 46.3% | 18.3% |
| MIA 2008-09 | 39.0% | 52.4% |
| MIA 2009-10 | 50.0% | 57.3% |
| MIA 2010-11 | 50.0% | 70.7% |
| MIA 2011-12 | 56.1% | 69.7% |
| MIA 2012-13 | 61.0% | 80.5% |
| MIA 2013-14 | 67.1% | 65.9% |
| MIA 2014-15 | 43.9% | 45.1% |
| MIA 2015-16 | 59.8% | 58.5% |
| MIA 2016-17 | 51.2% | 50.0% |
| MIA 2017-18 | 47.6% | 53.7% |
| MIA 2018-19 | 47.6% | 47.6% |
| MIA 2019-20 | 53.4% | 60.3% |
| MIA 2020-21 | 62.5% | 55.6% |
| MIA 2021-22 | 54.9% | 64.6% |
| MIA 2022-23 | 53.6% | 53.6% |
| MIA 2023-24 | 58.3% | 56.0% |
| MIA 2024-25 | 63.1% | 46.4% |
| MIA 2025-26 | 62.7% | 51.8% |
| MIL 1997-98 | 56.1% | 43.9% |
| MIL 1998-99 | 40.0% | 56.0% |
| MIL 1999-00 | 54.9% | 51.2% |
| MIL 2000-01 | 40.2% | 63.4% |
| MIL 2001-02 | 32.9% | 50.0% |
| MIL 2002-03 | 54.9% | 51.2% |
| MIL 2003-04 | 40.2% | 50.0% |
| MIL 2004-05 | 53.7% | 36.6% |
| MIL 2005-06 | 41.5% | 48.8% |
| MIL 2006-07 | 34.1% | 34.1% |
| MIL 2007-08 | 58.5% | 31.7% |
| MIL 2008-09 | 51.2% | 41.5% |
| MIL 2009-10 | 48.8% | 56.1% |
| MIL 2010-11 | 46.3% | 42.7% |
| MIL 2011-12 | 45.5% | 47.0% |
| MIL 2012-13 | 59.8% | 46.3% |
| MIL 2013-14 | 41.5% | 18.3% |
| MIL 2014-15 | 45.1% | 50.0% |
| MIL 2015-16 | 34.1% | 40.2% |
| MIL 2016-17 | 47.6% | 51.2% |
| MIL 2017-18 | 51.2% | 53.7% |
| MIL 2018-19 | 72.0% | 73.2% |
| MIL 2019-20 | 76.7% | 76.7% |
| MIL 2020-21 | 72.2% | 63.9% |
| MIL 2021-22 | 46.3% | 62.2% |
| MIL 2022-23 | 69.5% | 70.7% |
| MIL 2023-24 | 57.3% | 59.8% |
| MIL 2024-25 | 59.0% | 59.0% |
| MIL 2025-26 | 29.3% | 39.0% |
| MIN 1997-98 | 48.8% | 54.9% |
| MIN 1998-99 | 38.0% | 50.0% |
| MIN 1999-00 | 42.7% | 61.0% |
| MIN 2000-01 | 52.4% | 57.3% |
| MIN 2001-02 | 53.7% | 61.0% |
| MIN 2002-03 | 59.8% | 62.2% |
| MIN 2003-04 | 50.0% | 70.7% |
| MIN 2004-05 | 48.8% | 53.7% |
| MIN 2005-06 | 57.3% | 40.2% |
| MIN 2006-07 | 50.0% | 39.0% |
| MIN 2007-08 | 42.7% | 26.8% |
| MIN 2008-09 | 31.7% | 29.3% |
| MIN 2009-10 | 40.2% | 18.3% |
| MIN 2010-11 | 51.2% | 20.7% |
| MIN 2011-12 | 50.0% | 39.4% |
| MIN 2012-13 | 58.5% | 37.8% |
| MIN 2013-14 | 34.1% | 48.8% |
| MIN 2014-15 | 28.0% | 19.5% |
| MIN 2015-16 | 41.5% | 35.4% |
| MIN 2016-17 | 45.1% | 37.8% |
| MIN 2017-18 | 51.2% | 57.3% |
| MIN 2018-19 | 54.9% | 43.9% |
| MIN 2019-20 | 46.9% | 29.7% |
| MIN 2020-21 | 51.4% | 31.9% |
| MIN 2021-22 | 45.8% | 56.6% |
| MIN 2022-23 | 59.5% | 51.2% |
| MIN 2023-24 | 46.3% | 68.3% |
| MIN 2024-25 | 53.7% | 59.8% |
| MIN 2025-26 | 52.4% | 59.8% |
| BKN 1997-98 | 47.6% | 52.4% |
| BKN 1998-99 | 40.0% | 32.0% |
| BKN 1999-00 | 48.8% | 37.8% |
| BKN 2000-01 | 37.8% | 31.7% |
| BKN 2001-02 | 40.2% | 63.4% |
| BKN 2002-03 | 48.8% | 59.8% |
| BKN 2003-04 | 48.8% | 57.3% |
| BKN 2004-05 | 54.9% | 51.2% |
| BKN 2005-06 | 53.7% | 59.8% |
| BKN 2006-07 | 43.9% | 50.0% |
| BKN 2007-08 | 37.8% | 41.5% |
| BKN 2008-09 | 50.0% | 41.5% |
| BKN 2009-10 | 43.9% | 14.6% |
| BKN 2010-11 | 48.8% | 29.3% |
| BKN 2011-12 | 50.0% | 33.3% |
| BKN 2012-13 | 59.8% | 59.8% |
| BKN 2013-14 | 56.1% | 53.7% |
| BKN 2014-15 | 56.1% | 46.3% |
| BKN 2015-16 | 63.4% | 25.6% |
| BKN 2016-17 | 64.6% | 24.4% |
| BKN 2017-18 | 45.1% | 34.1% |
| BKN 2018-19 | 65.9% | 51.2% |
| BKN 2019-20 | 70.8% | 48.6% |
| BKN 2020-21 | 47.2% | 66.7% |
| BKN 2021-22 | 50.6% | 54.2% |
| BKN 2022-23 | 48.8% | 54.9% |
| BKN 2023-24 | 57.3% | 39.0% |
| BKN 2024-25 | 43.9% | 31.7% |
| BKN 2025-26 | 56.1% | 24.4% |
| NYK 1997-98 | 31.7% | 52.4% |
| NYK 1998-99 | 52.0% | 54.0% |
| NYK 1999-00 | 54.9% | 61.0% |
| NYK 2000-01 | 45.1% | 58.5% |
| NYK 2001-02 | 56.1% | 36.6% |
| NYK 2002-03 | 48.8% | 45.1% |
| NYK 2003-04 | 54.9% | 47.6% |
| NYK 2004-05 | 41.5% | 40.2% |
| NYK 2005-06 | 56.1% | 28.0% |
| NYK 2006-07 | 52.4% | 40.2% |
| NYK 2007-08 | 41.5% | 28.0% |
| NYK 2008-09 | 23.2% | 39.0% |
| NYK 2009-10 | 23.2% | 35.4% |
| NYK 2010-11 | 46.3% | 51.2% |
| NYK 2011-12 | 62.1% | 54.5% |
| NYK 2012-13 | 52.4% | 65.9% |
| NYK 2013-14 | 64.6% | 45.1% |
| NYK 2014-15 | 59.8% | 20.7% |
| NYK 2015-16 | 46.3% | 39.0% |
| NYK 2016-17 | 50.0% | 37.8% |
| NYK 2017-18 | 59.8% | 35.4% |
| NYK 2018-19 | 36.6% | 20.7% |
| NYK 2019-20 | 40.9% | 31.8% |
| NYK 2020-21 | 44.4% | 56.9% |
| NYK 2021-22 | 54.9% | 45.1% |
| NYK 2022-23 | 61.0% | 57.3% |
| NYK 2023-24 | 41.5% | 61.0% |
| NYK 2024-25 | 45.1% | 62.2% |
| NYK 2025-26 | 50.6% | 65.1% |
| ORL 1997-98 | 35.4% | 50.0% |
| ORL 1998-99 | 32.0% | 66.0% |
| ORL 1999-00 | 59.8% | 50.0% |
| ORL 2000-01 | 39.0% | 52.4% |
| ORL 2001-02 | 39.0% | 53.7% |
| ORL 2002-03 | 42.7% | 51.2% |
| ORL 2003-04 | 36.6% | 25.6% |
| ORL 2004-05 | 42.7% | 43.9% |
| ORL 2005-06 | 51.2% | 43.9% |
| ORL 2006-07 | 70.7% | 48.8% |
| ORL 2007-08 | 67.1% | 63.4% |
| ORL 2008-09 | 69.5% | 72.0% |
| ORL 2009-10 | 65.9% | 72.0% |
| ORL 2010-11 | 59.8% | 63.4% |
| ORL 2011-12 | 62.1% | 56.1% |
| ORL 2012-13 | 36.6% | 24.4% |
| ORL 2013-14 | 41.5% | 28.0% |
| ORL 2014-15 | 46.3% | 30.5% |
| ORL 2015-16 | 42.7% | 42.7% |
| ORL 2016-17 | 48.8% | 35.4% |
| ORL 2017-18 | 40.2% | 30.5% |
| ORL 2018-19 | 42.7% | 51.2% |
| ORL 2019-20 | 21.9% | 45.2% |
| ORL 2020-21 | 36.1% | 29.2% |
| ORL 2021-22 | 53.7% | 26.8% |
| ORL 2022-23 | 51.2% | 41.5% |
| ORL 2023-24 | 45.1% | 57.3% |
| ORL 2024-25 | 50.6% | 50.6% |
| ORL 2025-26 | 72.6% | 54.8% |
| IND 1997-98 | 53.7% | 70.7% |
| IND 1998-99 | 56.0% | 66.0% |
| IND 1999-00 | 52.4% | 68.3% |
| IND 2000-01 | 63.4% | 50.0% |
| IND 2001-02 | 51.2% | 51.2% |
| IND 2002-03 | 50.0% | 58.5% |
| IND 2003-04 | 54.9% | 74.4% |
| IND 2004-05 | 31.7% | 53.7% |
| IND 2005-06 | 39.0% | 50.0% |
| IND 2006-07 | 62.2% | 42.7% |
| IND 2007-08 | 61.0% | 43.9% |
| IND 2008-09 | 51.2% | 43.9% |
| IND 2009-10 | 35.4% | 39.0% |
| IND 2010-11 | 53.7% | 45.1% |
| IND 2011-12 | 51.5% | 63.6% |
| IND 2012-13 | 37.0% | 60.5% |
| IND 2013-14 | 43.9% | 68.3% |
| IND 2014-15 | 50.0% | 46.3% |
| IND 2015-16 | 46.3% | 54.9% |
| IND 2016-17 | 31.7% | 51.2% |
| IND 2017-18 | 24.4% | 58.5% |
| IND 2018-19 | 36.6% | 58.5% |
| IND 2019-20 | 31.5% | 61.6% |
| IND 2020-21 | 29.7% | 47.3% |
| IND 2021-22 | 36.6% | 30.5% |
| IND 2022-23 | 36.6% | 42.7% |
| IND 2023-24 | 39.8% | 56.6% |
| IND 2024-25 | 29.3% | 61.0% |
| IND 2025-26 | 48.8% | 23.2% |
| PHI 1997-98 | 41.5% | 37.8% |
| PHI 1998-99 | 52.0% | 56.0% |
| PHI 1999-00 | 37.8% | 59.8% |
| PHI 2000-01 | 47.6% | 68.3% |
| PHI 2001-02 | 50.0% | 52.4% |
| PHI 2002-03 | 36.6% | 58.5% |
| PHI 2003-04 | 36.6% | 40.2% |
| PHI 2004-05 | 56.1% | 52.4% |
| PHI 2005-06 | 52.4% | 46.3% |
| PHI 2006-07 | 64.6% | 42.7% |
| PHI 2007-08 | 63.4% | 48.8% |
| PHI 2008-09 | 64.6% | 50.0% |
| PHI 2009-10 | 78.0% | 32.9% |
| PHI 2010-11 | 50.0% | 50.0% |
| PHI 2011-12 | 28.8% | 53.0% |
| PHI 2012-13 | 29.3% | 41.5% |
| PHI 2013-14 | 28.0% | 23.2% |
| PHI 2014-15 | 45.1% | 22.0% |
| PHI 2015-16 | 41.5% | 12.2% |
| PHI 2016-17 | 41.5% | 34.1% |
| PHI 2017-18 | 62.2% | 63.4% |
| PHI 2018-19 | 50.0% | 62.2% |
| PHI 2019-20 | 63.0% | 58.9% |
| PHI 2020-21 | 54.2% | 68.1% |
| PHI 2021-22 | 67.1% | 62.2% |
| PHI 2022-23 | 48.8% | 65.9% |
| PHI 2023-24 | 56.6% | 57.8% |
| PHI 2024-25 | 39.0% | 29.3% |
| PHI 2025-26 | 50.6% | 55.4% |
| PHX 1997-98 | 61.0% | 68.3% |
| PHX 1998-99 | 54.0% | 54.0% |
| PHX 1999-00 | 51.2% | 64.6% |
| PHX 2000-01 | 36.6% | 62.2% |
| PHX 2001-02 | 40.2% | 43.9% |
| PHX 2002-03 | 47.6% | 53.7% |
| PHX 2003-04 | 35.4% | 35.4% |
| PHX 2004-05 | 47.6% | 75.6% |
| PHX 2005-06 | 42.7% | 65.9% |
| PHX 2006-07 | 62.2% | 74.4% |
| PHX 2007-08 | 68.3% | 67.1% |
| PHX 2008-09 | 68.3% | 56.1% |
| PHX 2009-10 | 57.3% | 65.9% |
| PHX 2010-11 | 51.2% | 48.8% |
| PHX 2011-12 | 47.0% | 50.0% |
| PHX 2012-13 | 39.0% | 30.5% |
| PHX 2013-14 | 36.6% | 58.5% |
| PHX 2014-15 | 52.4% | 47.6% |
| PHX 2015-16 | 56.1% | 28.0% |
| PHX 2016-17 | 47.6% | 29.3% |
| PHX 2017-18 | 34.1% | 25.6% |
| PHX 2018-19 | 31.7% | 23.2% |
| PHX 2019-20 | 39.7% | 46.6% |
| PHX 2020-21 | 54.2% | 70.8% |
| PHX 2021-22 | 70.7% | 78.0% |
| PHX 2022-23 | 68.3% | 54.9% |
| PHX 2023-24 | 72.0% | 59.8% |
| PHX 2024-25 | 53.7% | 43.9% |
| PHX 2025-26 | 71.4% | 54.8% |
| POR 1997-98 | 63.4% | 56.1% |
| POR 1998-99 | 70.0% | 70.0% |
| POR 1999-00 | 74.4% | 72.0% |
| POR 2000-01 | 69.5% | 61.0% |
| POR 2001-02 | 45.1% | 59.8% |
| POR 2002-03 | 32.9% | 61.0% |
| POR 2003-04 | 46.3% | 50.0% |
| POR 2004-05 | 57.3% | 32.9% |
| POR 2005-06 | 51.2% | 25.6% |
| POR 2006-07 | 45.1% | 39.0% |
| POR 2007-08 | 57.3% | 50.0% |
| POR 2008-09 | 61.0% | 65.9% |
| POR 2009-10 | 45.1% | 61.0% |
| POR 2010-11 | 68.3% | 58.5% |
| POR 2011-12 | 62.1% | 42.4% |
| POR 2012-13 | 39.0% | 40.2% |
| POR 2013-14 | 40.2% | 65.9% |
| POR 2014-15 | 32.9% | 62.2% |
| POR 2015-16 | 39.0% | 53.7% |
| POR 2016-17 | 40.2% | 50.0% |
| POR 2017-18 | 59.8% | 59.8% |
| POR 2018-19 | 67.1% | 64.6% |
| POR 2019-20 | 65.3% | 48.0% |
| POR 2020-21 | 48.6% | 58.3% |
| POR 2021-22 | 63.4% | 32.9% |
| POR 2022-23 | 61.0% | 40.2% |
| POR 2023-24 | 48.8% | 25.6% |
| POR 2024-25 | 50.0% | 43.9% |
| POR 2025-26 | 51.8% | 51.8% |
| SAC 1997-98 | 36.6% | 32.9% |
| SAC 1998-99 | 48.0% | 54.0% |
| SAC 1999-00 | 46.3% | 53.7% |
| SAC 2000-01 | 43.9% | 67.1% |
| SAC 2001-02 | 47.6% | 74.4% |
| SAC 2002-03 | 34.1% | 72.0% |
| SAC 2003-04 | 53.7% | 67.1% |
| SAC 2004-05 | 35.4% | 61.0% |
| SAC 2005-06 | 46.3% | 53.7% |
| SAC 2006-07 | 48.8% | 40.2% |
| SAC 2007-08 | 45.1% | 46.3% |
| SAC 2008-09 | 41.5% | 20.7% |
| SAC 2009-10 | 34.1% | 30.5% |
| SAC 2010-11 | 53.7% | 29.3% |
| SAC 2011-12 | 37.9% | 33.3% |
| SAC 2012-13 | 28.0% | 34.1% |
| SAC 2013-14 | 37.8% | 34.1% |
| SAC 2014-15 | 46.3% | 35.4% |
| SAC 2015-16 | 40.2% | 40.2% |
| SAC 2016-17 | 65.9% | 39.0% |
| SAC 2017-18 | 45.1% | 32.9% |
| SAC 2018-19 | 42.7% | 47.6% |
| SAC 2019-20 | 45.8% | 43.1% |
| SAC 2020-21 | 54.2% | 43.1% |
| SAC 2021-22 | 42.7% | 36.6% |
| SAC 2022-23 | 31.7% | 58.5% |
| SAC 2023-24 | 28.6% | 56.0% |
| SAC 2024-25 | 38.6% | 48.2% |
| SAC 2025-26 | 51.2% | 26.8% |
| SAS 1997-98 | 59.8% | 68.3% |
| SAS 1998-99 | 56.0% | 74.0% |
| SAS 1999-00 | 62.2% | 64.6% |
| SAS 2000-01 | 64.6% | 70.7% |
| SAS 2001-02 | 62.2% | 70.7% |
| SAS 2002-03 | 59.8% | 73.2% |
| SAS 2003-04 | 51.2% | 69.5% |
| SAS 2004-05 | 59.8% | 72.0% |
| SAS 2005-06 | 48.8% | 76.8% |
| SAS 2006-07 | 64.6% | 70.7% |
| SAS 2007-08 | 53.7% | 68.3% |
| SAS 2008-09 | 50.0% | 65.9% |
| SAS 2009-10 | 58.5% | 61.0% |
| SAS 2010-11 | 61.0% | 74.4% |
| SAS 2011-12 | 62.1% | 75.8% |
| SAS 2012-13 | 58.5% | 70.7% |
| SAS 2013-14 | 59.8% | 75.6% |
| SAS 2014-15 | 70.7% | 67.1% |
| SAS 2015-16 | 52.4% | 81.7% |
| SAS 2016-17 | 56.1% | 74.4% |
| SAS 2017-18 | 63.4% | 57.3% |
| SAS 2018-19 | 36.6% | 58.5% |
| SAS 2019-20 | 40.8% | 45.1% |
| SAS 2020-21 | 47.9% | 45.2% |
| SAS 2021-22 | 54.2% | 41.0% |
| SAS 2022-23 | 41.5% | 26.8% |
| SAS 2023-24 | 58.5% | 26.8% |
| SAS 2024-25 | 69.5% | 41.5% |
| SAS 2025-26 | 77.1% | 74.7% |
| OKC 1997-98 | 67.1% | 74.4% |
| OKC 1998-99 | 46.0% | 50.0% |
| OKC 1999-00 | 47.6% | 54.9% |
| OKC 2000-01 | 64.6% | 53.7% |
| OKC 2001-02 | 56.1% | 54.9% |
| OKC 2002-03 | 39.0% | 48.8% |
| OKC 2003-04 | 62.2% | 45.1% |
| OKC 2004-05 | 63.4% | 63.4% |
| OKC 2005-06 | 43.9% | 42.7% |
| OKC 2006-07 | 41.5% | 37.8% |
| OKC 2007-08 | 39.0% | 24.4% |
| OKC 2008-09 | 48.8% | 28.0% |
| OKC 2009-10 | 32.9% | 61.0% |
| OKC 2010-11 | 45.1% | 67.1% |
| OKC 2011-12 | 47.0% | 71.2% |
| OKC 2012-13 | 45.1% | 73.2% |
| OKC 2013-14 | 54.9% | 72.0% |
| OKC 2014-15 | 74.4% | 54.9% |
| OKC 2015-16 | 70.7% | 67.1% |
| OKC 2016-17 | 65.9% | 57.3% |
| OKC 2017-18 | 64.6% | 58.5% |
| OKC 2018-19 | 62.2% | 59.8% |
| OKC 2019-20 | 72.2% | 61.1% |
| OKC 2020-21 | 54.2% | 30.6% |
| OKC 2021-22 | 20.7% | 29.3% |
| OKC 2022-23 | 31.0% | 48.8% |
| OKC 2023-24 | 58.5% | 69.5% |
| OKC 2024-25 | 51.8% | 81.9% |
| OKC 2025-26 | 52.4% | 78.0% |
| TOR 1997-98 | 43.9% | 19.5% |
| TOR 1998-99 | 58.0% | 46.0% |
| TOR 1999-00 | 36.6% | 54.9% |
| TOR 2000-01 | 45.1% | 57.3% |
| TOR 2001-02 | 41.5% | 51.2% |
| TOR 2002-03 | 29.3% | 29.3% |
| TOR 2003-04 | 51.2% | 40.2% |
| TOR 2004-05 | 59.8% | 40.2% |
| TOR 2005-06 | 54.9% | 32.9% |
| TOR 2006-07 | 42.7% | 57.3% |
| TOR 2007-08 | 48.8% | 50.0% |
| TOR 2008-09 | 54.9% | 40.2% |
| TOR 2009-10 | 53.7% | 48.8% |
| TOR 2010-11 | 32.9% | 26.8% |
| TOR 2011-12 | 40.9% | 34.8% |
| TOR 2012-13 | 45.1% | 41.5% |
| TOR 2013-14 | 50.0% | 58.5% |
| TOR 2014-15 | 42.7% | 59.8% |
| TOR 2015-16 | 50.0% | 68.3% |
| TOR 2016-17 | 48.8% | 62.2% |
| TOR 2017-18 | 53.7% | 72.0% |
| TOR 2018-19 | 47.6% | 70.7% |
| TOR 2019-20 | 43.1% | 73.6% |
| TOR 2020-21 | 34.7% | 37.5% |
| TOR 2021-22 | 40.2% | 58.5% |
| TOR 2022-23 | 47.0% | 49.4% |
| TOR 2023-24 | 47.6% | 30.5% |
| TOR 2024-25 | 45.1% | 36.6% |
| TOR 2025-26 | 45.1% | 56.1% |
| UTA 1997-98 | 48.8% | 75.6% |
| UTA 1998-99 | 46.0% | 74.0% |
| UTA 1999-00 | 58.5% | 67.1% |
| UTA 2000-01 | 54.9% | 64.6% |
| UTA 2001-02 | 45.1% | 53.7% |
| UTA 2002-03 | 47.6% | 57.3% |
| UTA 2003-04 | 56.1% | 51.2% |
| UTA 2004-05 | 35.4% | 31.7% |
| UTA 2005-06 | 45.1% | 50.0% |
| UTA 2006-07 | 43.9% | 62.2% |
| UTA 2007-08 | 43.9% | 65.9% |
| UTA 2008-09 | 42.7% | 58.5% |
| UTA 2009-10 | 52.4% | 64.6% |
| UTA 2010-11 | 41.5% | 47.6% |
| UTA 2011-12 | 43.9% | 54.5% |
| UTA 2012-13 | 45.1% | 52.4% |
| UTA 2013-14 | 48.8% | 30.5% |
| UTA 2014-15 | 46.3% | 46.3% |
| UTA 2015-16 | 50.0% | 48.8% |
| UTA 2016-17 | 56.1% | 62.2% |
| UTA 2017-18 | 51.2% | 58.5% |
| UTA 2018-19 | 69.5% | 61.0% |
| UTA 2019-20 | 58.3% | 61.1% |
| UTA 2020-21 | 58.3% | 72.2% |
| UTA 2021-22 | 62.2% | 59.8% |
| UTA 2022-23 | 48.8% | 45.1% |
| UTA 2023-24 | 40.2% | 37.8% |
| UTA 2024-25 | 57.3% | 20.7% |
| UTA 2025-26 | 57.3% | 26.8% |
| MEM 1997-98 | 28.0% | 23.2% |
| MEM 1998-99 | 30.0% | 16.0% |
| MEM 1999-00 | 24.4% | 26.8% |
| MEM 2000-01 | 35.4% | 28.0% |
| MEM 2001-02 | 45.1% | 28.0% |
| MEM 2002-03 | 48.8% | 34.1% |
| MEM 2003-04 | 47.6% | 61.0% |
| MEM 2004-05 | 43.9% | 54.9% |
| MEM 2005-06 | 57.3% | 59.8% |
| MEM 2006-07 | 46.3% | 26.8% |
| MEM 2007-08 | 52.4% | 26.8% |
| MEM 2008-09 | 47.6% | 29.3% |
| MEM 2009-10 | 61.0% | 48.8% |
| MEM 2010-11 | 57.3% | 56.1% |
| MEM 2011-12 | 75.8% | 62.1% |
| MEM 2012-13 | 68.3% | 68.3% |
| MEM 2013-14 | 63.4% | 61.0% |
| MEM 2014-15 | 62.2% | 67.1% |
| MEM 2015-16 | 56.1% | 51.2% |
| MEM 2016-17 | 53.7% | 52.4% |
| MEM 2017-18 | 52.4% | 26.8% |
| MEM 2018-19 | 43.9% | 40.2% |
| MEM 2019-20 | 62.2% | 45.9% |
| MEM 2020-21 | 51.4% | 54.1% |
| MEM 2021-22 | 73.2% | 68.3% |
| MEM 2022-23 | 69.5% | 62.2% |
| MEM 2023-24 | 62.2% | 32.9% |
| MEM 2024-25 | 71.4% | 58.3% |
| MEM 2025-26 | 39.0% | 30.5% |
| WAS 1997-98 | 50.0% | 51.2% |
| WAS 1998-99 | 40.0% | 36.0% |
| WAS 1999-00 | 34.1% | 35.4% |
| WAS 2000-01 | 36.6% | 23.2% |
| WAS 2001-02 | 42.7% | 45.1% |
| WAS 2002-03 | 39.0% | 45.1% |
| WAS 2003-04 | 41.5% | 30.5% |
| WAS 2004-05 | 48.8% | 54.9% |
| WAS 2005-06 | 37.8% | 51.2% |
| WAS 2006-07 | 46.3% | 50.0% |
| WAS 2007-08 | 43.9% | 52.4% |
| WAS 2008-09 | 37.8% | 23.2% |
| WAS 2009-10 | 42.7% | 31.7% |
| WAS 2010-11 | 65.9% | 28.0% |
| WAS 2011-12 | 56.1% | 30.3% |
| WAS 2012-13 | 54.9% | 35.4% |
| WAS 2013-14 | 54.9% | 53.7% |
| WAS 2014-15 | 59.8% | 56.1% |
| WAS 2015-16 | 59.8% | 50.0% |
| WAS 2016-17 | 61.0% | 59.8% |
| WAS 2017-18 | 76.8% | 52.4% |
| WAS 2018-19 | 41.5% | 39.0% |
| WAS 2019-20 | 38.9% | 34.7% |
| WAS 2020-21 | 41.9% | 47.3% |
| WAS 2021-22 | 35.4% | 42.7% |
| WAS 2022-23 | 63.4% | 42.7% |
| WAS 2023-24 | 32.9% | 18.3% |
| WAS 2024-25 | 50.0% | 22.0% |
| WAS 2025-26 | 34.1% | 20.7% |
| DET 1997-98 | 53.7% | 45.1% |
| DET 1998-99 | 54.0% | 58.0% |
| DET 1999-00 | 54.9% | 51.2% |
| DET 2000-01 | 70.7% | 39.0% |
| DET 2001-02 | 54.9% | 61.0% |
| DET 2002-03 | 61.0% | 61.0% |
| DET 2003-04 | 68.3% | 65.9% |
| DET 2004-05 | 62.2% | 65.9% |
| DET 2005-06 | 64.6% | 78.0% |
| DET 2006-07 | 34.1% | 64.6% |
| DET 2007-08 | 29.3% | 72.0% |
| DET 2008-09 | 42.7% | 47.6% |
| DET 2009-10 | 58.5% | 32.9% |
| DET 2010-11 | 43.9% | 36.6% |
| DET 2011-12 | 33.3% | 37.9% |
| DET 2012-13 | 39.0% | 35.4% |
| DET 2013-14 | 64.6% | 35.4% |
| DET 2014-15 | 72.0% | 39.0% |
| DET 2015-16 | 72.0% | 53.7% |
| DET 2016-17 | 79.3% | 45.1% |
| DET 2017-18 | 68.3% | 47.6% |
| DET 2018-19 | 78.0% | 50.0% |
| DET 2019-20 | 68.2% | 30.3% |
| DET 2020-21 | 45.8% | 27.8% |
| DET 2021-22 | 37.8% | 28.0% |
| DET 2022-23 | 41.5% | 20.7% |
| DET 2023-24 | 51.2% | 17.1% |
| DET 2024-25 | 48.8% | 53.7% |
| DET 2025-26 | 43.9% | 73.2% |
| CHA 1997-98 | 62.2% | 62.2% |
| CHA 1998-99 | 62.0% | 52.0% |
| CHA 1999-00 | 53.7% | 59.8% |
| CHA 2000-01 | 56.1% | 56.1% |
| CHA 2001-02 | 61.0% | 53.7% |
| CHA 2004-05 | 29.3% | 22.0% |
| CHA 2005-06 | 31.7% | 31.7% |
| CHA 2006-07 | 34.1% | 40.2% |
| CHA 2007-08 | 39.0% | 39.0% |
| CHA 2008-09 | 54.9% | 42.7% |
| CHA 2009-10 | 45.1% | 53.7% |
| CHA 2010-11 | 47.6% | 41.5% |
| CHA 2011-12 | 51.5% | 10.6% |
| CHA 2012-13 | 47.6% | 25.6% |
| CHA 2013-14 | 32.9% | 52.4% |
| CHA 2014-15 | 45.1% | 40.2% |
| CHA 2015-16 | 31.7% | 58.5% |
| CHA 2016-17 | 29.3% | 43.9% |
| CHA 2017-18 | 62.2% | 43.9% |
| CHA 2018-19 | 26.8% | 47.6% |
| CHA 2019-20 | 49.2% | 35.4% |
| CHA 2020-21 | 37.0% | 45.2% |
| CHA 2021-22 | 43.4% | 51.8% |
| CHA 2022-23 | 40.2% | 32.9% |
| CHA 2023-24 | 43.9% | 25.6% |
| CHA 2024-25 | 61.0% | 23.2% |
| CHA 2025-26 | 41.7% | 53.6% |
A cleaner check is to look at a jump ball from a different game. If the tip helps you win tonight, then tonight's tip should predict tonight's result, and a tip in some other game shouldn't. But it does. Regular-season teams that go on to win the tip in their next game, a jump ball that hasn't happened yet, win tonight 51.3% of the time, against 48.8% for teams about to lose it.
A tip from another game predicts tonight
Win rate of teams that won or lost the named tip, regular season
See the data
| Which tip | Won it: win rate | Lost it: win rate | Gap (points) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tonight's tip | 52.9% | 47.1% | 5.8 |
| Last game's tip | 51.4% | 48.6% | 2.8 |
| Next game's tip | 51.3% | 48.8% | 2.5 |
You can also come at it from the other side. Compare only games between the same two teams, in the same building, in the same season, where the tip went one way in some games and the other way in others, and the five-point gap shrinks to about 2.3 points. Rate every team's strength using only its earlier results, then compare tip winners to tip losers of equal strength, and about 1.9 points survive. So roughly three of the five points go away once you account for who is playing whom. (The full set of comparisons, including the betting line, is further down.)
Who takes the tip
Is the last couple of points the tip's real effect? Mostly not, because the tip also tells you something a season-long rating can't: who actually takes the tip tonight.
The opening tip is usually taken by the starting center, who is usually one of the team's best players. When he doesn't take it (hurt, resting, traded, or swapped out for the matchup), two things happen at once: the team's tip rate falls, and the team gets worse. Take the 573 team-seasons where a team's usual jumper took at least 20 opening tips and didn't take at least 10 others. In the games he didn't jump, the team won 7.4 points fewer tips and 4.0 points fewer games. So winning the tip is partly a sign that your best big man is on the floor.
Add that one fact, whether the usual jumper took the tip, to the strength-adjusted comparison, and the leftover edge drops from 1.9 points to about 1.4. It's a crude flag. It knows nothing about the other four starters, minute limits or back-to-backs, which all tend to go along with center absences. A sharper cut makes the point. In games where both teams' usual jumpers took the tip, the leftover edge is about 1 point, too small to tell apart from zero. In games where at least one usual jumper was missing, it's about 3 points. (Both figures adjust for team strength.)
The playoffs lean the same way, though not conclusively. In the postseason, when everyone who can play does, tip winners win 51.8%. That's lower, but within the noise for 2,368 games.
Home court shows up too. Home teams win 51.4% of opening tips, and it isn't about personnel, because the same jumper wins about 3 points more of his jumps at home than on the road. Whatever home court is made of (sleep, familiarity, crowd), some of it shows up even here. It's a small piece, worth about a quarter of a point of the headline number.
Controlling for the betting line
A strength rating only knows results. Bookmakers know more: by tip-off their price reflects injuries, rest, back-to-backs and how a matchup is likely to go. If the leftover edge is hidden team quality, the betting line should absorb it.
So I took the closing point spread for 32,394 regular-season games, every one since 1999-2000 that has a line on record, and ran the same comparison on exactly the same games. The last two rows of the chart are new: the spread on its own, and the spread plus the usual-jumper flags.
The tip winner’s edge as controls are added
Home team's win rate after winning the tip minus after losing it, in points. Dot = estimate, line = 95% range
See the data
| Comparison | Edge (points) | 95% range |
|---|---|---|
| Raw gap | +4.93 | +3.85 to +6.00 |
| Same two teams, same building, same season | +2.24 | +0.35 to +4.14 |
| Teams of equal strength, rated from earlier games | +1.91 | +0.90 to +2.92 |
| …and whether the usual jumpers took the tip | +1.38 | +0.37 to +2.39 |
| Closing spread instead of the strength rating | +0.65 | −0.34 to +1.64 |
| …and the usual-jumper flags | +0.45 | −0.54 to +1.44 |
The line does what the strength rating couldn't. The raw gap is 4.9 points. The strength rating takes it to 1.9, the rating plus the jumper flags to 1.4, and the closing spread to 0.65. Add the jumper flags to the spread and it's 0.45. Both of those have 95% ranges that include zero (−0.3 to +1.6, and −0.5 to +1.4). The answer barely moved when I let the link between spread and winning bend and added season effects, kept the strength rating in alongside the spread, grouped the uncertainty by season, or built the jumper flags from earlier games only. Every variant landed between 0.59 and 0.67. Moneylines, which exist from 2006-07 on, tell the same story: 0.74 on 23,778 games.
Tip winners against the betting market
Tip winners' win probability, 23,778 games with moneylines, 2006-07 to 2025-26
See the data
| Measure | Value |
|---|---|
| Games | 23,778 |
| Tip winners' actual win rate | 52.83% |
| Market's pregame price for the same teams | 52.45% |
| Left over (points) | +0.4 (−0.2 to +1.0) |
To put that in plainer terms: in the games with moneylines, the teams that won the tip won 52.8% of the time. Before the game, the betting market had already rated those same teams at 52.4%. So the market had priced in almost nine-tenths of the edge, and what was left was 0.4 of a point, give or take 0.6.
The line even knows about the tip. Bookmakers don't price the jump ball, yet the spread predicts which team wins it, and once you have the spread, the strength rating adds nothing. To me that's the clearest sign that the tip is picking up things the market already knew: lineups, health and who is likely to jump. The usual-jumper split from the last section shrinks too. With the spread in, games where both usual jumpers took the tip show 0.1 points, and games with at least one missing show 1.3, both within the noise.
That isn't proof the tip is worth nothing, though. Three caveats:
- Indistinguishable from zero isn't zero. The 95% range runs to about 1.6 points, and a test of this size would reliably catch an effect only if it were larger than about 1.4. A small real effect is possible.
- The line did clearly more than the strength rating. On the same games, swapping the rating for the spread lowers the estimate by about 1.3 points (1.0 to 1.5 when I resample the games), even though the two ranges overlap.
- The leftover isn't the same in every era. Split into three stretches, it's about zero in 1999-2000 to 2009-10 (−0.1) and 2018-19 to 2025-26 (+0.3), and about 2 points in 2010-11 to 2017-18 (+0.1 to +3.7). One of three stretches landing near 2 is weak evidence on its own, but it's why the same test run on 2011-12 to 2021-22 alone finds about 1 point.
None of this is a betting system. Knowing the tip winner before the line closed would have been worth about 0.4 of a point of win probability, give or take 0.6, against an average bookmaker margin of about 3%. And nobody knows the tip winner before the tip.
Close games and overtime
There is one place where the tip looks like it matters. In games that are close entering the fourth quarter (within three points, about a fifth of all games), the team that won the opening tip wins 54.1% of the time. The obvious explanation is that the tip winner gets the first possession of the fourth quarter, right when games are decided.
But that's not what's happening. By the end of the third quarter the tip winner has had half a possession fewer than its opponent, since it has opened one quarter and its opponent has opened two. Half a possession is worth about half a point (opening a period is worth about +0.46 points). So a game that's tied after three quarters isn't really even: the tip winner has kept pace while short half a possession, and the fourth-quarter possession just evens it out.
The tip winner’s possession edge through the game
Tip winner's running edge in possessions, through the game
See the data
| Point in the game | Tip winner minus loser, possessions |
|---|---|
| Tip-off | +0.00 |
| After Q1 | +0.50 |
| After Q2 | +0.01 |
| After Q3 | −0.49 |
| Final | +0.00 |
Over the full 48 minutes the possessions balance to within a hundredth, which is why none of this adds anything to the 52.8%. It does make for some decent trivia, though. If the score is tied heading into the fourth, the team that won the opening tip is effectively about half a point ahead. In the roughly 1,200 games that were dead even after three quarters, it went on to win 51.5%, which is too few games to say much more.
Overtime is different, because it starts with a new jump ball, and this time nobody gets the possession back. The period just ends. The team that wins the overtime tip ends up with about half a possession more than its opponent (0.48 on average) in what starts as a tied game, and wins 55.7% of the time (56.9% when there's only one overtime). Half a point is a lot in a period usually decided by four or five. By itself it's worth three or four points of win probability, so between half and two-thirds of that edge is real, mechanical value. A sliver of the rest is the same story as the opening tip, since the favorite wins the overtime tip 53% of the time, and the remainder is within the margin of error for 2,176 games.
| Opening tip | Overtime tip | |
|---|---|---|
| Games | 36,765 | 2,176 |
| Won by the tip winner | 52.8% | 55.7% |
| Possessions gained | about 0, given back by rule | +0.48, never given back |
This is a different jump ball. The team that won the opening tip wins the overtime tip only 54% of the time, and only 6% of games get that far, so overtime explains essentially none of the opening-tip gap (a few hundredths of a percentage point). It's the one jump ball all night that is worth winning.
Where the five points go
Here is the whole accounting, built by adding one control at a time. The order matters, so these bars aren't shares of causes. They show how much of the gap each added control removes.
Where the five points go
How much of the raw gap each added control removes, in points
See the data
| Games | Raw gap | Team strength | Who took the tip | Betting line | Left over |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regular season, 1999-2000 to 2025-26 | 4.93 | 3.02 | 0.53 | 0.93 | 0.45 |
- Who you are. Good teams have good centers, and good centers win tips. Team strength removes about 3 of the 5 points.
- Who is on the floor. The tip is usually taken by your starting center. Counting who took the tip removes about half a point more.
- What the market knew. The closing spread removes about two-thirds of what the strength rating and the jumper flags left behind.
- What is left. Under half a point, with a range that includes zero. The possession itself adds nothing, because the rules give it back.
Home court is held fixed in this accounting, because the comparison is home teams that won the tip against home teams that lost it. In the 52.8% headline, home court is worth about a quarter of a point.
So I wouldn't read "tip winners win 52.8%" as "the tip is worth 2.8 points of win probability." The tip tells you about the roster, the center's health and home court, and as far as I can tell from the possession math, it adds nothing measurable to the next 48 minutes. Teams that win tips were mostly going to win anyway. The one exception is the tip at the start of overtime.
What this does and does not show
What it shows:
- The tip nets no possessions over a game, and the gap in win rate shrinks from five points to under one as the controls get stricter.
- Winning tips is a persistent individual skill, and the usual jumper being absent is a real signal.
- The overtime tip is worth roughly half a possession.
What it doesn't:
- It isn't an experiment. Every adjusted number is an association, and a small causal effect of one or two points is still possible.
- The lines are archived closing lines from several sources, and most carry no per-quote timestamp, so some may not be the final price.
- "Usual jumper" is defined after the fact, as whoever jumped most for a team that season. Defining it from earlier games only, as a bettor would have had to, moves the final estimate from 0.45 to about 0.65.
- It isn't a betting strategy. It says nothing about prices available after the tip.
How it was measured: possession-level data covers 36,765 regular-season and playoff games, 1997-98 through 2025-26 (about 7 million possessions). Game winners come from official NBA results. Quarter-by-quarter points come from play-by-play, which differs from the official score, almost always by two points or fewer, in about 15% of games. "Winning the tip" means gaining the game's first possession, which matches the officially recorded jump-ball result in 99.98% of games. Jumpers are the actual jump-ball participants recorded in the league's play-by-play, available for 99.9% of games. "Team strength" is a rating updated after every game and built only from earlier results. Adjusted comparisons use regular-season games since 1999-2000 and carry a margin of about ±1 point. "Regular season" includes play-in games. Quarter-opening rules are in NBA Rule 6.
The betting-line test uses the closing point spread for 32,394 regular-season games from 1999-2000 to 2025-26 (43 games from those seasons have no line), joined on the official game id. The spread enters the model as the market's expected margin for the home team. Moneylines, from 2006-07 on, have the bookmaker's margin removed by scaling the two implied probabilities to sum to one; a few games with implausible prices were set aside. Effects are average changes in home win probability from a logistic model, with 95% ranges robust to unequal variance.